During all these years of political decline, many experts have been working on how to rebuild our democracy. Here’s one take based on a feasible scenario: the negotiations producing a cohabitation government.
By Caracas Chronicles – By José Alberto Vargas La Roche
Aug 23, 2021
Almost everyone with the slightest concern about Venezuela tends to fall prey to the immediacy syndrome, that being, focusing all their ideas, efforts, and thoughts on the issue of regime change and its how-to: either in an absolute manner or through a negotiated transition, or even with a pragmatic and cynical power cohabitation.
It makes sense that with such a deep humanitarian crisis our top priority should be the removal of chavismo from power or, at least, paving the road for a gradual transition. Either way, we’re running out of options.
Uprooting the Bolivarian revolution and getting a democratically elected government is the essential prerequisite for the country’s complete normalization, that’s the truth. But the job would be far from complete there. Most people forget that Venezuela has a sprawling, deep-rooted problems that won’t end with a change of government.
If the current México negotiations between chavismo and opposition bear any results – which I hope for, but doubt – some of these problems could even begin to be dealt with a moderate chavista regime – which to be honest, I wouldn’t buy – or a government born from a power-sharing agreement – far from ideal, but a step forward.
If we want Venezuela to secure its future in the mid and long term and to eventually reach true stability and prosperity, we need to work to build a solid Rule of Law and become a full democracy.
Some readers may think that this isn’t that urgent and shouldn’t be dealt with now. But the reality is that we need to come with a plan beforehand. And when I say a plan, I don’t mean abstract, nebulous promises like the ones the democratic opposition often presents in a press conference in some theater and then puts in a drawer. What I mean are specific measures designed to build a strong institutional framework for the country to run smoothly.
In that sense, I’m convinced that a realistic institution buildup to be undertaken by a hypothetical power-sharing government – the more likely scenario on the short term—has to revolve around the following key areas of reform:
First, Demilitarize
Venezuela has been a militaristic country from its inception. Its first generation of rulers was composed of the triumphant officers of the War of Independence, followed by a century of clashing regional warlords and long and ruthless military dictatorships during the first half of the 20th century.
The democratic period of 1958-1998 seemed to have put the Army in check, but chavismo, having been born from military figures, gave a disproportionate share of power to the Armed Forces. Military men and women have occupied every imaginable ministry, agency and bureau since 1999, controlling everything from banks, to mining in the Orinoco basin, media outlets, healthcare, citizen identification, culture and management of the national power grid.
Political discourse and the national conscience, in general, seem to have been conquered by the arms as well. Everyone from government officials to opposition leaders and common citizens tend to express their political views in belligerent and militaristic terms. We all see things with a dualistic approach: the enemy and us. We talk about struggle, resistance and conquering. We adopt warmonger symbols such as the 1814 “Guerra a Muerte” banner.
Besides this, in what is a structural problem, most of the members of the Armed Forces, from petty officers to top generals, have taken part in corruption or criminal activity in some way, from taking bribes and extorting people, to illegal mining and drug and weapon trafficking. Moreover, military academies and bases have become ideological hotspots that convert soldiers to the chavista religion. This has bought their loyalty to chavismo, enabling it to use the military to suppress dissent and control enemies.
A strong democracy can’t be controlled by the military. Even democracies with powerful and ever-present armed forces like the United States are always governed and guided by civilian authority. What’s more, no country that pretends to uphold the Rule of Law can possess armed forces as corrupted, ideological and powerful as Venezuela’s. An indispensable condition to the normalization of the country’s life is its demilitarization.
To be realists, chavistas won’t commit themselves to a full demilitarization. The Armed Forces are far too entrenched in the power structures. As such, the best way to deal with this would begin by giving back civil agencies to civilians. This would reduce the military influence and bring the system back under the control of civil servants.
Another essential move is to start depoliticizing the Army. A transition government must get rid of ideological slogans, oaths of loyalty to Chávez, teaching socialist doctrine in military academies and symbols such as red berets and shirts or the ever-present Chávez eyes.
Last but not least, stopping the extortion and harassment of security forces on people is an important measure to reduce social stress and anxiety and create a functional society. This needs to be coupled with the imprisoning and trial of every top-brass officer involved in drugs and arms trafficking. I can’t think of a better message of reform. Things won’t keep the same way.
Second, Reform the Justice System
Of course, in order to deliver appropriate justice to that sort of people, the judicial system must face serious reform. For that, judges, including Supreme Tribunal justices, must be selected by an independent public agency composed of fellow judges and academics and free of the interference of the Executive.
This would allow the law community to select adequate magistrates, with both the intellectual and ethical stature a person that upholds justice and fairness ought to have, and the personal independence of not being conditioned by partisan loyalty to access the office.
Besides that, most of Venezuela’s judges work under interim status and can be freely removed from office by the overly politicized Supreme Tribunal. If a judge is assigned a case with important political repercussions or particular personal interest for any Justice of the Supreme Tribunal or high-ranking government official, their ruling is going to be determined by the potential consequences they may face if that decision goes against those murky interests.
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Read More: Caracas Chronicles – A realistic approach to immediate institutional reform in Venezuela
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